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kanamycin, or amikacin) (4); no 
remarkable change in duration of 
treatment resulted when those 4 cases 
were removed from analysis. 
The surveillance system captures 
only the initial treatment regimen; 
thus, we could not assess changes 
to treatment regimens in response 
to drug susceptibility test results or 
treatment nonadherence. We observed 
no difference in history of prior TB; 
HIV infection; or miliary, meningeal, 
pediatric, or bone and joint TB among 
case-patients with isoniazid-resistant 
versus drug-susceptible TB (p>0.12 
for all comparisons). TB treatment 
recommendations in the United 
States emphasize completion within 
12 months of initiating therapy, with 
exceptions for rifampin-resistant TB, 
meningeal TB, and disseminated 
disease in pediatric patients (children 
<15 years of age) (1,5). We found no 
change in treatment duration by drug-
resistance pattern after removing cases 
of meningeal TB or cases in children 
from analysis.
The length of TB treatment 
duration in the United States has 
improved since therapy outcomes 
were ﬁ  rst recorded in the National TB 
Surveillance System in 1993. In our 
study, 90% of case-patients with drug-
susceptible TB completed therapy 
within 373 days, compared with 671 
days in 1993 (6), and 90% of patients 
with isoniazid-monoresistant TB 
completed therapy within 432 days. 
Although the percentage of MDR TB 
cases in the United States has declined 
since 1993, drug resistance remains a 
serious concern because the percentage 
of isoniazid-monoresistant TB cases 
has remained stable (7). Our analysis 
suggests that despite the effectiveness 
of rifampin-containing regimens and 
an apparent lack of clinical differences 
to justify extending therapy, longer 
treatment durations persist among 
patients with isoniazid-monoresistant 
TB (8). In our cohort study, <75% of 
patients with rifampin-monoresistant 
TB and 40% with MDR TB completed 
therapy within 24 months, suggesting 
no improvement since 1993 in the 
length of treatment duration for 
rifampin-resistant TB strains (6).
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Exposure of US 
Travelers to Rabid 
Zebra, Kenya, 2011
To the Editor: Rabies is an acute 
progressive encephalitis caused by 
infection with a lyssavirus (genus 
Lyssavirus, family Rhabdoviridae) 
(1). Most human infections are caused 
by bites from rabid animals, but 
the virus also can be transmitted by 
contact of open wounds or mucous 
membranes with animal saliva (1,2). 
Prompt administration of postexposure 
prophylaxis (PEP) is recommended to 
prevent rabies (3). Canids are common 
sources of human exposures in many 
regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America (4). However, all mammals 
are susceptible, including herbivores 
such as horses, cattle, and antelope 
(5–7).
Approximately 16–200 rabies 
virus exposures occur per 100,000 
international travelers (2). Travelers 
might be unaware of exposure risks 
from less commonly affected species 
because prevention guidelines focus 
on avoiding contact with feral and 
wild carnivores (primarily dogs) and 
bats (2). After travelers at a safari 
lodge in Kenya were exposed to a 
rabid zebra, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
international partners conducted 
1202  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 18, No. 7, July 2012LETTERS
a contact investigation to ensure 
affected travelers received timely 
exposure assessments and appropriate 
PEP recommendations.
In January 2011, an orphaned 
zebra foal was taken to a safari lodge 
for care. Tourists were permitted to 
view, pet, and feed the zebra. A dog 
suspected of being rabid bit the zebra 
on July 31. Attempts to capture the 
dog for testing were unsuccessful. The 
zebra became ill around August 24 
and died on August 26 (Figure).
Rabies was suspected because of 
neurologic signs and was diagnosed in 
the zebra after detection of rabies virus 
antigens by direct ﬂ  uorescent antibody 
testing at the Kenya Central Veterinary 
Laboratory. Lodge staff received 
results on August 30 and immediately 
communicated the information to 
travelers who had visited during 
July 24–August 26 by email through 
booking travel agents (because lodge 
staff did not have traveler contact 
information). This email conveyed 
the diagnosis and information about 
rabies virus transmission and vaccine 
and advised travelers to consult their 
physicians if they believed they were 
at risk.
On September 1, after receiving 
the email, several US travelers 
reported contact with the zebra’s 
mouth and saliva to state health 
ofﬁ  cials. State health ofﬁ  cials notiﬁ  ed 
CDC that same day. CDC initiated a 
contact investigation of US travelers; 
the World Health Organization 
International Health Regulations 
Ofﬁ   ce coordinated contact in-
vestigation for non-US travelers. The 
Kenya Ministry of Public Health and 
Sanitation, Field Epidemiology and 
Laboratory Training Program, and 
the Kenya Wildlife Service performed 
environmental assessments, evaluated 
lodge staff and animal exposures, 
and reviewed bite surveillance and 
preparedness in the surrounding 
district. CDC Rabies Program staff 
corroborated the rabies diagnosis 
and genotyped the variant as one 
associated with dogs in Africa, 
supporting the presumed transmission 
through dog bite.
On September 8, lodge staff 
provided CDC with travelers’ 
surnames, number of travelers per 
group, countries of citizenship and 
residence, and travel agent contact 
information. Of 243 travelers, 136 
(56%) were US residents from 14 
states (online Technical Appendix 
Table 1, wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/pdfs/
12-0081-Techapp.pdf). The remaining 
107 travelers were residents of 16 
countries, primarily in Europe (online 
Technical Appendix Figure). CDC 
obtained traveler contact information 
from travel agents. State health 
ofﬁ   cials contacted US travelers by 
telephone or email.
Viral shedding duration for rabid 
zebras is unknown. An infectious 
period was estimated as the 14 days 
from the foal’s illness until its death 
(August 10–26) (8). Of 136 US 
travelers, 77 (57%) visited the lodge 
during this period. The remaining 59 
US travelers who visited during July 
24–August 9 also were contacted to 
document medical assistance received 
and to provide rabies education.
Twenty-eight (21%) US travelers 
had already initiated PEP when 
interviewed by state public health 
ofﬁ   cials. Exposure risk categories 
based on Advisory Committee 
on Immunization Practices re-
commendations were developed to 
address the unique circumstances of 
this investigation, i.e., the period and 
nature of travelers’ exposures to the 
zebra (online Technical Appendix 
Table 2) (3). None reported high-risk 
exposures; 2 reported moderate-risk 
exposures; and 26 reported low- or no-
risk exposures, for which PEP would 
not have been recommended. CDC 
has not received any reports of human 
rabies in travelers exposed to the zebra 
in this incident.
Initial exposure notiﬁ  cations  to 
travelers were delivered by travel 
agents, rather than public health 
ofﬁ   cials. Public health intervention 
was delayed while traveler contact 
information was obtained. During 
this delay, travelers sought care 
from private physicians who made 
time-sensitive PEP decisions with 
incomplete information, resulting 
in unnecessary PEP administration 
according to published standards 
(3). Unnecessary PEP should be 
avoided because rabies biologicals are 
expensive (averaging $4,000/patient 
[9]), and rabies PEP entails small 
but real risk for adverse events (3). 
Inclusion of a health provision in travel 
agency privacy agreements to permit 
release of traveler contact information 
for public health use would improve 
response times for similar events.
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Figure. Timeline of events for traveler exposures to a rabid zebra and subsequent contact 
investigation of US travelers, Kenya, January 2011–September 2011. CDC, Centers for 
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Travelers to rabies-endemic 
regions should avoid contact with 
wild and feral animals, even in 
seemingly safe captive settings (2). 
Any mammal can be rabid, and 
infectious animals might appear 
healthy for several days before 
illness onset; avoiding all wild and 
feral animals while traveling is the 
ideal preventive measure. All animal 
bites and scratches should be washed 
thoroughly with soap and water and 
receive immediate medical attention 
(2).
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To the Editor: In autumn 
2011, an unidentiﬁ   ed disease of 
livestock was reported on both sides 
of the Dutch–Germany border. By 
using metagenomics, the etiologic 
agent of this disease was identiﬁ  ed 
as a novel orthobunyavirus and 
named Schmallenberg virus (SBV) 
(1). Other members of the genus 
Orthobunyavirus (e.g., Akabane 
virus) are widespread in Africa and 
Asia; biting midges (Culicoides spp.) 
and mosquitoes are responsible for 
transmitting these viruses. Hence, we 
reasonably assumed that European 
culicoids might be responsible for 
transmitting SBV within Europe. 
We present evidence that culicoids 
captured October 2011 in Denmark 
contained SBV RNA and most likely 
are vectors for this agent.
In autumn 2011, culicoids were 
collected from several sites within 
Denmark. One site, a chicken farm in 
Hokkerup (online Appendix Figure, 
wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/18/7/12-
0385-FA1.htm), was selected for study 
because of its location close (6 km) 
to the German border and proximity 
(<10 km) to an SBV-infected sheep 
farm in Germany, as reported on 
March 9, 2012, by the Friedrich 
Loefﬂ  er Institute surveillance website 
(www.ﬂ  i.bund.de).  The  culicoids 
were collected during October 
14–16 by using a Mosquito Magnet 
Independence trap (Mosquito Magnet, 
Lititz, PA, USA) baited with carbon 
dioxide and octenol. Midges were 
sorted manually into 91 specimens of 
the C. obsoletus group (comprising C. 
obsoletus,  C. chiopterus,  C. dewulﬁ  , 
and  C. scoticus) and 17 of the C. 
punctatus sensu stricto group, then 
stored at −20°C.
Pools of culicoids were 
homogenized in water (100 μL) by 
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